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Understanding «Understanding» 
Industrial Relations Research and Policy 
in Canada from 1969 to 1984 ... and Beyond 
H. W. Arthurs 
This paper is the H.D. Woods Memorial Lecture presented at 
the 1984 Annual Meeting of the Canadian Industrial Relations 
Association, Guelph, Ontario. 
Canadian Industrial Relations, the report of the Woods Task Force on 
Labour Relations, appeared in 1969 1• At the time, and for some years 
thereafter, many of us who were in some way associated with the Task 
Force nurtured two hopes. First, we believed that the Report itself would 
usher in a new era in labour-management relations, and second, we believed 
that it signalled the coming of age of industrial relations as a scholarly 
discipline or, rather, as the quintessential interdiscipline, each part of which 
could only be understood in relation to the others. Woods himself shared 
these hopes. As he said in the letter which transmitted the Report to the 
Prime Minister . 
. . . we would hope that this Report and the studies ... will generate a greater 
understanding of the problems and issues in the field of industrial relations in 
Canada; and that they will stimulate further research in this important area. 
Now, fifteen years later, as the Macdonald Commission finds itself in 
the midst of a similar - albeit more extensive - enterprise, some recon-
sideration of both themes may be timely. How far have we managed to pro-
gress towards the benign regime of understanding sought by Woods and his 
colleagues, and towards the new age of intellectual enquiry he, and they -
and we - would have wished for? 
I cannot personally place on the record either eye-witness testimony or 
scientific evidence to support my conclusions; my own involvement in the 
field as a practitioner and as a scholar has been only intermittent over the 
past ten or fifteen years. But I do have my suspicions and perhaps if I voice 
them, they will at least stimulate those who are closer to the facts to rise and 
bear witness. 
First, to the extent that the behaviour of labour and management, the 
public and government reflect the present state of «understanding», one 
could hardly be positive about the record of Canada's collective bargaining 
system since 1969. At various times during this period, we have seen ex-
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1 Canadian Industrial Relations, The Report of Task Force on Labour Relations, 
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treme manifestations of militancy and intransigence by both sides rather 
than the growth of maturity; increased state intervention rather than 
enhanced self-government in industry; waning public tolerance for the costs 
of industrial conflict rather than greater willingness to accept such costs as 
the price of free collective bargaining; compounding complexity and 
legalism rather than common-sense attempts to resolve problems pragma-
tically. In short, the very premises of the «understanding» contemplated by 
the Task Force have been put in question. 
To turn to Woods' hope that research would be stimulated, here again 
rather the contrary seems to have occurred. At least in my own field of 
labour relations law, but perhaps in other areas of industrial relations 
research, development seems to have been at best modest. The perplexing 
problems of labour-management relations have not, apparently, engaged 
the attention of our most innovative scholars, nor does a sturdy yeomanry 
of researchers seem to have consistently produced a bountiful harvest of 
books and articles. This assessment of research is, however, both tentative 
and preliminary - «tentative» because it is subject to revision by a proper 
assessment of the state of the art which is just now getting under way, 
«preliminary» because I will elaborate upon what I have said later in my 
remarks. 
But, in general and subject to these lawyer-like attempts to hedge my 
bets, my impression is that neither in terms of enhanced understanding nor 
in terms of intensified research activity have the hopes of the Task Force, 
and of the Task Force generation of scholars, been realized. The question I 
want to pursue is «why?»? What I want to do is to understand «understan-
ding», using that term to encompass both its meanings - «understanding» 
in the sense of tolerance and the appreciation of mutual interdependence 
which is of the essence of a system of collective bargaining, and «understan-
ding» in the sense of an informed and critical attitude which is of the 
essence of research. 
Let me begin with «understanding» in the industrial relations sense. 
The promotion of «understanding» is obviously a matter about which the 
Macdonald Commission has been, and will be, concerned. Its mandate en-
compasses a number of industrial relations themes, its ambitious research 
programme includes many labour-related studies, and its recommendations 
cannot fail to include proposals designed to improve the state of 
«understanding» in the world of work. How, indeed, could any grand 
design to enhance Canada's social and economic well-being fail to do so? 
Yet, at the same time, we must ask how it is that the Task Force Report 
which addressed these very issues failed to accomplish its objectives? 
The answer is, in part, that the Task Force failed to foresee the advent 
of a new economic ice age, the retreat of prosperity and the chilling of op-
timism in the 1970s. Standing at the watershed of 1969, it was easy enough 
to look back twenty or thirty years, at Canada's recovery from the Great 
Depression, at the growth and diversification of industry and industrial 
employment, at the contentious beginnings - but apparently permanent 
establishment - of collective bargaining as primary public policy, at the 
emergence of the labour movement as a social and political presence as well 
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as an effective economic instrument for its members - in short, at the ap-
parent normalization of relations between the collective bargaining part-
ners. 
This is not to claim that labour-management relations in the late 1960s 
were then perceived as idyllic, as incapable of further evolution or improve-
ment. Of course they were not: that is why the Task Force was appointed. 
But the questions raised about collective bargaining then were relatively 
modest concerns. Collective bargaining itself was a «given»; its present 
legitimacy and future survival were not seriously questioned. Rather, the 
Task Force itself stated that its objective was «to examine the relationship 
between collective bargaining and many of Canada's other socio-economic-
political goals, policies and instruments» with a view to «reconciling» all of 
these. (135) It concluded its examination, and commenced its recommenda-
tions, with the general observation that 
We continue to endorse the present industrial relations system in Canada not 
only because of its virtues ... but because we see no alternative that is compati-
ble with the heritage of western values and institutions ... (427) 
I have described this view as one which looks backward at Canada's 
postwar experience rather than forward to the 1970s and 1980s. If we could 
have looked forward, what would we have seen? 
With only a little prescience, I imagine, we might have addressed the 
difficulties implied by changing demographic and labour force trends: an 
entire generation of young people entering the labour force through the 
1970s, many more of them women than before, confronting social obliga-
tions and financial debts of daunting proportions, but unable to anticipate 
normal patterns of progression from school to work to retirement 
Their plight, I suggest, we might have foreseen had we been able to 
recognize the signs and portents. But who in 1969 could have anticipated 
that someone would have cried havoc and unleashed the dogs of war, 
galloping oil prices, inflation, monetarism, unemployment and protec-
tionism? Who could have imagined that in the 1970s and 1980s the pace of 
capital concentration would quicken in Canada, or that the multinationals 
would rapidly redeploy their manufacturing operations into selected third 
world countries? Who could have predicted the rise and fall of Alberta's oil 
patch, British Columbia's forest products, Ontario's secondary manufac-
turing sector, and the Atlantic fisheries - with the awful strains that these 
events imposed upon our political and economic union? 
Even if the mandate of the Woods Task Force had been as broad as 
that of the Macdonald Commission, even if it had more thoroughly ex-
plored the socio-political-economic context of our industrial relations 
system, it could never have begun to plan for these events which, in 1969, 
lay just over the horizon. But foreseeable or not, these and other largeloom-
ing events of the past fifteen years have created - to borrow a phrase - «a 
new reality» in which all of our assumptions - including the survival of col-
lective bargaining as we hnow it - are being called into question. 
Let me try to describe that new reality as it might appear from the 
perspective of a hypothetical Task Force assessing the industrial relations 
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system in 1984 or, let us say, of the Macdonald Commission, as it diagnoses 
and prescribes for the industrial ills of our time. 
To begin with the brutal truth: there is no basic <<Understanding»; 
labour is locked out. It is not an effective participant in the political life of 
the country, plays a social role but fitfully and with limited impact, and ex-
ercises adventitious economic power here and there, now and then, but 
without well-defined purposes or predictable outcomes. «Labour», indeed, 
lacks even the dignity of definition. It is not a movement, but at best several 
loose coalitions of largely decentralized unions; it is not a class, but at best a 
range of occupations which imply no necessary commonality of economic 
circumstance or interest, cultural or social values; it is not even a predictable 
condition of life, but (as so many Canadians now know) at best an aspira-
tion to get a job or hold onto one. 
The fundamental issue of industrial policy confronting the Macdonald 
Commission is whether it wants to recognize this new - and brutal - reali-
ty and what it proposes to do to revise it. 
As to recognition of labour's plight, the Commission has been, and will 
doubtless again be, reminded that conditions of life for most Canadians, 
even now, are amongst the most favourable in the world. The Commission 
will be, and has been, urged (perhaps even by «labour» spokesmen) to im-
prove, but not fundamentally to alter, the existing industrial arrangements 
which have brought us relative affluence and considerable freedom. But 
while this will be the general tenor of some submissions, the Commission will 
also hear many emotionally-charged arguments designed to gain its sym-
pathy or bring down its wrath upon real and supposed abuse in the labour 
sector. 
Forty years after collective bargaining was embraced as a basic policy 
in Canada, it will be said, many employers remain intransigently opposed to 
it; some governements will casually trade it away for almost any «greater 
good»; and the public generally is out of sympathy with its practise and 
perceived results. On the other hand, it will be said that Canadian workers 
are more strike-prone and less efficient than those of our major interna-
tional competitors, and that unionization has overburdened the financial 
resources of public and private employers alike. Econometric analysis will 
purport to reveal that minimum wages injure the job prospects of women, 
minority groups and young people. Ethical philosophers, theologians and 
close observers of poverty will remind us of our moral duty to the working 
and non-working poor. 
But whatever the intrinsic force of these particular arguments, few of 
them will help the Commission gain an overall perspective on «labour» and 
its role in the Canadian economic union. This it cannot do without confron-
ting three issues which, indeed, reappear in almost every area of its man-
date. 
First, there is the issue of strinking a new balance between reliance 
upon unregulated market mechanisms and extensive planning and interven-
tionism. Labour policy has indeed become more interventionist in recent 
years: witness the AIB, «6 and 5», the conscious decisions to create 
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unemployment, reduce inflation and - recently - to sacrifice trade union 
power to propitiate the gods of investment. But there is no evidence that in-
tervention is planned extensively - or at all. On the contrary, improvisa-
tion seems to be the order of the day, and little ongoing effort is made to in-
volve labour (or anyone else) in the development and implementation of 
long-term public strategies or counterpart activities at the sectoral or cor-
porate level. 
Macdonald will neither lay the ghost of Adam Smith, nor commune 
with Karl Marx. But decisions to alter the mix of spontaneous action and 
planning, and of private and public decision-making, will affect the labour 
sector: manpower training and deployment, unemployment insurance and 
strike statistics are all implicated in this basic issue. 
A second issue, made inescapable by the mandate of the Commission, 
is the difficulty of divorcing economics from the rest of life. The tremors of 
the labour market, for example, signal possible deep rifts in the social 
fabric: family life and mental health, educational and cultural attainments, 
attitudes towards minority groups may all be significantly determined by 
plant closings, structural unemployment and other consequences of hard-
nosed economic policy-making. Decisions to repress labour strife by legal 
sanctions, in order to improve overall industrial performance, may trespass 
on fundamental, constitutional rights of equality, association or com-
munication. Even benign social measures, such as the introduction of 
«equal pay for equal work», which may or may not have macro-economic 
significance, may produce unexpected consequences as their costs are 
sought to be offset within the firm or displaced elsewhere. All of this is trite, 
but these examples underline for the Commission the need for holistic treat-
ment in its deliberations, rather than for the mere aggregation of specialist 
diagnoses and prescriptions. Economics is too important to be left to 
economists, law to lawyers, and politics to once and future kings. 
Nor, thirdly, can the Macdonald Commission afford to assume that 
once adopted, even coherent policies will be translated into operational 
reality. Before leading a horse to water, one must have a horse - and 
water. The situation of labour - precisely because the term «labour» is so 
amorphous - illustrates the point. Suppose that the Commission were to 
recommend the adoption of an industrial strategy, one of whose com-
ponents was a fundamental «understanding», a social compact amongst 
government, business and «labour», which promised the latter both a voice 
in key decisions and a fair share of their consequences. (Such a recommen-
dation is, I believe, both desirable and inevitable.) How would a willing 
government go about implementing such a recommendation? 
Who would government and business «understand» with? Who would 
negotiate and sign the social compact on behalf of labour? the CLC or pro-
vincial labour federations? alone or together with rival, schismatic, and 
non-affiliated unions? with what binding effect upon the organizations they 
represent, and upon the locals of those organizations which, under our 
system, hold bargaining rights and by tradition make autonomous, 
democratic decisions on contract ratification and strikes? Similar concerns 
would arise with regard to the ability of «business» to deliver a binding 
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commitment on behalf of its members, compounded by the difficulty of en-
couraging inter-firm cooperation on the labour market while outlawing it 
on the product market. And even government must lift the pen to sign a 
social contract with either a provincial or federal hand, wield it with an arm 
whose wrist was under the control of, say, the labour department, its elbow 
of Finance, and its shoulder of Consumer and Corporate Affairs. all the 
while harbouring the mental reservations which are the privilege of 
sovereign legislatures. 
Moreover, if «understanding» is to be institutionalized, if «labour» is 
to have a place in the higher councils of the nation, and if that place brings 
with it a degree of power to make political and social decisions with 
economic consequences, there is likely to be a decline in the relative impor-
tance (already modest) of local collective bargaining. Such a shift in 
labour's priorities and in the locus of authority within the ranks of labour 
would diminish the ability of individual workers and their local unions to 
participate directly in the processes of industrial government. It is essential 
therefore that concurrent and compensatory measures be addressed in order 
to improve both the accountability of central labour representatives to their 
constituents, and the actual direct participation of those constituents in 
shop-floor and firm-level decisions about matters which cannot sensibly be 
resolved elsewhere. Such matters range from work rules to quality control, 
from investment policies to plant amenities, from health and safety to skills 
training. 
And if these transformations of labour's role in the economy and of 
«labour» itself are a realistic possibility, we may still have to pause for a 
moment before entering this Nirvana of «understanding». We would have 
to ask ourselves whether this incorporation of «labour» into the managerial 
structures of the state and the plant might in fact leave workers with the 
worst of both worlds. Should they forfeit the right of defining and persuing 
their own interests, without gaining a firm assurance that those interests will 
be fairly protected, and that their contribution to the general welfare will be 
matched by the contributions of others? 
In this brief recital of the «labour» issues confronting the Macdonald 
Commission, we can recognize some familiar themes. Above all, it has 
become clear that as with liberal democratic politics, federalism, or the 
market system itself, the basic problem is how to reconcile a principled com-
mitment to the autonomy of individual actors with the allure of «understan-
ding», and the logic of planning, integration, and order. If autonomy is ac-
cepted as a «given», no strategy proposed by Macdonald is likely to suc-
ceed. If «understanding», planning, integration and order are the way to 
improve Canada's economic performance and brighten her social pro-
spects, these can only be achieved by structural and institutional changes 
which reduce the autonomy of workers and unions, of businessmen and 
bankers, of federal and provincial governments and their many emanations. 
What the Commission must earnestly consider is whether the chicken of in-
stitutional change can precede the egg of a commitment to greater social 
and economic planning or only follow it. In short, it must understand the 
implications of «understanding». 
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If we once concede that all <<Understandings» involving government, 
labour and management are vulnerable to the impact of external events 
which we cannot anticipate, control or effectively respond to, if we once 
concede that the very project of enhanced «understanding» is haunted by 
unresolved internal contradictions, what is the point of pursuing research in 
industrial relations? 
It is possible to answer that question from several different perspec-
tives. As a scholar, I am tempted to ignore it altogether, on the ground that 
research needs no such justification. It is enough for archeologists and 
astronomers, for mathematicians and linguists, that their research reveals 
what is not known and offers new ways of understanding what is known. 
Why not also for those of us interested in industrial relations? 
As someone also interested in the practical world of human affairs, 
however, I confess that my answer as a scholar will not be universally accep-
table. At a minimum, I can imagine that a politician here or a bureaucrat 
there or a partisan labour or business official somewhere else might be very 
impatient with research in industrial relations which seemed neither to pro-
mise nor to produce any practical benefit. I would have, indeed, to confess 
that, with hindsight, the research undertaken by the Task Force might be 
regarded in this light. After all, the Task Force probably generated more 
research than could be found in all the journals, thesis abstracts and govern-
ment studies written since MacKenzie King was a pup (my language is ver-
nacular, not spiritualistic). Yet the ink was hardly dry, the honoraria hardly 
spent, before the policy prescriptions based upon that research had become 
anachronistic. 
I have already suggested that the failure of research was, in part, an 
unavoidable failure of foresight. To this extent, it can hardly be faulted. 
However, I now wish to propose that there may be other difficulties with in-
dustrial relations research which sometimes diminish its capacity to help us 
to «understand». 
The first of these difficulties I have already signalled when I referred to 
my own ambivalent perspective as both a scholar and a person involved in 
practical affairs. While no doubt a healthy tension can, and should, exist 
between theory and practice, I do point out that when both inhabit the same 
human mind - mine, for example - there are special risks which must be 
guarded against. Essentially, these involve the dominance of practise over 
theory. What we experience in our daily lives, what we «know» by doing, 
becomes the paradigm, the deep structure, within which research is con-
ducted. We too easily accept as inevitable, almost as a decree of nature, the 
continuation of present policies and institutions and values, imagining only 
that they are capable of evolution or marginal decline. We too diffidently 
question and too seldom reconceptualize the very essence of our industrial 
relations system. Certainly the Woods Report and most of its supporting 
studies - judged as research - suffer from a failure to reach beyond the 
conventional wisdom. 
A second difficulty, linked to the first, involves such mundane issues as 
time and money. Many industrial relations researchers are in frequent de-
mand to serve as policy advisers, administrators and fixers - arbitrators 
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and mediators - in the world of labour and management. The rhythm of 
their research is therefore often quickened or broken by some new assign-
ment; it seldom has an opportunity to build slowly and to mature fully. 
Moreover, much of the most ambitious and serious research in the field 
is commissioned research. Quite naturally, the commissioning body deter-
mines the orientation, budgets, timing and principal personnel and most im-
portant, the very subject to be studied. Despite the best intentions of 
research directors, the dominance of commissioned research in industrial 
relations does skew research priorities. It means that the abilities of some of 
our most able scholars are devoted at any given moment not to the problems 
which they believe most urgent, because they open up new lines of intellec-
tual development, but to the problems which someone else deems most 
pressing from a public policy perspective. 
Indeed, so pressing is the demand for public policy research from time 
to time - during the Woods and Macdonald efforts, for example - that it 
mobilizes many people into vast expeditionary forces of researchers whose 
primary qualifications are neither knowledge, nor interest - but only 
availability. Their presence further dilutes the quality of industrial relations 
research. 
The difficulty of focussing the attention of the best minds upon the 
most fundamental problems over an appropriate period of concentration is 
a not uncommon one; it certainly haunts other disciplines - including my 
own. But industrial relations suffers from one special difficulty which is not 
universally experienced. Industrial relations is, as I earlier suggested, the in-
terdiscipline, par excellence. There is no social science of which I am aware 
which cannot help us to «understand» industrial relations. Nor can we fail 
to appreciate the possible contributions of humanistic, scientific and 
technical studies. But genuine collaboration and cross-disciplinary research 
are notoriously difficult. They will rarely achieve the highest standards 
when those involved pursue such activities only fitfully and for short-run 
ends. 
Ironically, then, the disappointed hopes of the Woods Report for the 
stimulation of research reflect the very circumstances under which research 
was conducted by the Task Force. Those circumstances persist today, I 
believe, and will haunt the work of Macdonald to promote «understan-
ding». 
What remains for me is to offer only a few brief observations in aid of 
understanding the links between the two types of «understanding» I have 
identified. 
The empirically unverified assumption of our industrial relations 
system is that if we create appropriate formal conditions, workers will exer-
cise their right to organize, form unions and use sensibly their collective 
strength as a countervailing force to that historically possessed by 
employers; that employers in turn will come to internalize the statutorily-
imposed values of a good faith relationship with their workers; and that all 
of them and all of us will live happily ever after. The largely unresearched 
reality is that none of these assumptions have been fully justified, and that 
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collective bargaining as a system has yet to demonstrate its capacity to cope 
with change or crisis. 
The implicit premises of industrial relations research are likewise at 
odds with reality. We assume that research can do things for us - interpret 
the past, administer the present, transform the future - but the conditions 
in which we often pursue research are poorly designed for such tasks, and 
hardly evince respect for scholarship for its own sake. 
I should like to propose that these two phenomena are indeed related. 
So long as the interests of labour, management and government (and of 
each of their constituent elements) are seen to diverge and conflict, no 
amount of research will promote «understanding» amongst them. On the 
contrary, research is at best a threatening enterprise whose «scientific» 
revelations may embarrass or indict, at worst a sinister and cynical device 
deliberately employed to belabour one's enemies. Given the socio-political-
economic context within which much research is conducted, one should 
hardly wonder at the hostility exhibited by leading labour and management 
spokesmen towards intellectuals and theoreticians, either practising their 
own trade or pursuing some part-time role in policy-making, administration 
or dispute resolution. Nor should we be surprised by government's 
philandering attitude towards the research community, whose favour it 
courts intermittently and for its own purposes, while exibiting often a cer-
tain lack of basic respect. 
The consciousness, as well as the behaviour, of researchers is in part 
determined by this context, and they have difficulty in pursuing their own 
objectives according to their own lights. Much research is devoted to recor-
ding and evaluating the existing system; much scholarly energy is dissipated 
in texts for practitioners and students and in practical, but ephemeral, 
work. And finally, such fundamental intellectual work as is undertaken 
tends to be treated trivially by its suspicious and partisan audience. 
If this diagnosis has any merit, then I am afraid that «understanding» 
in the scientific sense is not likely to improve until one of two things hap-
pen: either fundamental tensions are eased in the world of work, so that in-
dustrial relations research can be treated less opportunistically and with 
greater respect, or research begins more clearly to define its own context 
and integrity outside of the practical realm of Task Forces and Royal Com-
missions. Thus, I am afraid that industrial relations research, as we now 
know it, has at best limited capacity to promote «understanding» amongst 
the interested parties. 
My reluctant conclusion is, therefore, that «understanding» and 
«understanding», practise and research, politics and science, had best exist 
at arm's length for a while, until each acquires the maturity to participate in 
a more intimate and fulfilling relationship. 
